Coherentism is the name given to a few philosophical theories in modern
epistemology, the study of knowledge. There are two distinct types of coherentism. One is the
coherence theory of truth; the other, the coherence
theory of justification. Coherent truth is divided between an anthropological approach, which applies only to localized networks ('true within a given sample of a population, given our understanding of the population'), and an approach that is judged on the basis of universals, such as categorical sets. The anthropological approach belongs more properly to
Correspondence theory, while the universal theories are a small development within
Analytic philosophy. The coherentist theory of justification, which may be interpreted as relating to either theory of coherent truth, characterizes
epistemic justification as a property of a belief only if that belief is a member of a coherent set. What distinguishes coherentism from other theories of justification is that the set is the primary bearer of justification. As an
epistemological theory, coherentism opposes dogmatic
foundationalism and also
infinitism through its insistence on definitions. It also attempts to offer a solution to the
regress argument that plagues correspondence theory. In an epistemological sense, it is a theory about how
belief can be proof-theoretically
justified. Coherentism is a view about the structure and system of knowledge, or else justified belief. The coherentist's thesis is normally formulated in terms of a denial of its contrary, such as dogmatic foundationalism, which lacks a proof-theoretical framework, or correspondence theory, which lacks universalism.
Counterfactualism, through a vocabulary developed by
David K. Lewis and his
Many worlds theory although popular with philosophers, has had the effect of creating wide disbelief of universals amongst academics. Many difficulties lie in between hypothetical coherence and its effective actualization. Coherentism claims, at a minimum, that not all knowledge
AND justified belief rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferential knowledge
OR justified belief. To defend this view, they may argue that conjunctions (AND) are more specific, and thus in some way more defensible, than disjunctions (OR).